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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for transportation security
37 results foundAuthor: Countermeasures Assessment and Security Experts Title: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers Summary: Worldwide terrorist activities create many security-related concerns for government leaders, security agencies, and transit agency managers. In response to these concerns, many transit agencies are assessing and introducing activities to reduce the risk of attacks on their systems. Most public transportation agencies have instituted security measures and continue to re-assess their situation as new threats are identified. One measure receiving more consideration is the introduction of passenger security inspections. However, there are many policy and logistical issues associated with implementing these inspections. Public transportation agencies could benefit from assistance in defining their options for conducting passenger security inspections. Apart from determining whether security inspections are feasible for one's agency, there is also a need to determine appropriate methodologies for implementing such measures. The objective of this guide is to provide guidance that a public transportation agency may use when considering whether, where, when, and how to introduce a passenger security inspection program into its operations. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2007. 180p. Source: Internet Resource; TCRP Report 86; Public Transportation Security, Volume 13 Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119336 Keywords: Passenger ScreeningTerrorismTransit CrimeTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges Summary: "To enhance avaiation security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began initial testing in October 2003 of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) carry out SPOT’s mission to identify persons who pose a risk to aviation security by focusing on behavioral and appearance indicators. GAO was asked to review the SPOT program. GAO analyzed (1) the extent to which TSA validated the SPOT program before deployment, (2) implementation challenges, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures SPOT’s effect on aviation security. GAO analyzed TSA documents, such as strategic plans and operating procedures; interviewed agency personnel and subject matter experts; and visited 15 SPOT airports, among other things. Although the results from these visits are not generalizable, they provided insights into SPOT operations. GAO recommends that TSA, among other things, use an independent panel of experts to assist in validating SPOT, enhance SPOT data collection and analysis, fully utilize TSA resources to identify possible threats, and establish a plan to develop more outcome-oriented measures for SPOT. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and generally concurred with our recommendations although its plans do not fully address one of our recommendations." Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2010. 89p. Source: Internet Resource; GAO-10-763; Accessed August 16, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10763.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10763.pdf Shelf Number: 119615 Keywords: Airport SecurityPassenger ScreeningTransportation Security |
Author: Victoria. Auditor General Title: Personal Safety and Security on the Metropolitan Train System Summary: The audit examined how successful Victoria Police (VicPol) and the Department of Transport (the department) had been from mid-2005 in reducing crime on Melbourne’s train system and making passengers feel safe when travelling. During 2008–09 there were more than 7 000 criminal offences reported on Melbourne’s train system and this equates to 33 offences per million passenger boardings. These offences happened on trains, at stations and station car parks. These account for about 75 per cent of all recorded offences on public transport in Victoria. Perceptions of safety are important because they influence how people behave, and they do not solely depend on levels of crime. For these reasons it is important that crime and perceptions of safety are managed as two connected but separate objectives. VicPol and the department have been successful in reducing crime on Melbourne’s train system since 2007–08. In contrast, the approach to improve passengers’ perceptions of safety has not been effective and requires focussed attention. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Auditor-General, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 7, 2010 at: http://download.audit.vic.gov.au/files/20100609_Rail_Safety_Full_Report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://download.audit.vic.gov.au/files/20100609_Rail_Safety_Full_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 119756 Keywords: Transit CrimeTransit SecurityTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should be Reviewed Summary: U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats—including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others—in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) has vessel tracking systems in place, (2) can use these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) has coordinated the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials. To ensure efficient use of resources, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information already available through national technical means. DHS agreed with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-09-337: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Shelf Number: 114343 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: Engel, A.W. van den Title: Organised Theft of Commercial Vehicles and their Loads in the European Union Summary: This study analyses the problems, developments and implications of organised theft of commercial vehicles and their loads in the EU. It gives an overview of the volume, nature and yearly damage of this form of organised theft. Furthermore, it analyses how the problem is tackled in the Member States and on the EU level. The final chapter contains recommendations on how European and national policy should deal with organised theft in the road transport sector in the future. Details: Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department Structural and Cohension Policies, 2007. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2011 at: http://www.setpos.eu/docs/organised%20theft%20of%20commercial%20vehicles%20and%20their%20loads%20in%20the%20EU%20july%202007%20EN.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Europe URL: http://www.setpos.eu/docs/organised%20theft%20of%20commercial%20vehicles%20and%20their%20loads%20in%20the%20EU%20july%202007%20EN.pdf Shelf Number: 122017 Keywords: Cargo TheftFreight IndustryStolen GoodsStolen PropertyTheft (Europe)Transport IndustryTransport TheftTransportation Security |
Author: Wijs, Rutger de Title: Improving Knowledge Transfer in Public-Private Partnerships that Confront Dutch Road Freight Transport Related Crime Summary: Because road freight transport safety in the Netherlands is a rising concern, the Dutch police and the affected Dutch transport sector, along with a number of other public and private stakeholders, have joined forces in the form of public-private partnership initiatives directed toward confronting road freight transport related crime in the Netherlands. As all parties involved possess unique but relevant knowledge, transferring this knowledge between partners is important. However, it is also difficult to achieve. Therefore the problem statement of this research is: how can knowledge transfer be improved in Public-Private Partnerships that confront Dutch road freight transport related crime? The knowledge transfer environment is shaped by the way Public-Private Partnerships are organised as well as the way people within them interact with each other and the knowledge to be transferred. This environment consists of 10 factors, which are all interrelated. To investigate how knowledge transfer occurs in these Public-Private Partnerships and to offer recommendations on how this can be improved, 18 semi-structured interviews were held with the most relevant and available people from five Public-Private Partnerships. The recommendations on how to improve knowledge transfer in Public-Private Partnerships that confront Dutch road freight transport related crime are organised in terms of how to improve structure and interaction. Structural recommendations refer to increased interaction by strategic and operational level partnerships, care for the ideal organisational structure, the inclusion of an operational field lab as well as a knowledge securing software system and the screening of potential partners as well as the optimal amount of partners and their preferred organisation size. The interaction recommendations refer to increasing empathy between partners, stimulating open communication, ensuring that the people who represent a partner stay on for the long-term and selecting the people who represent partners based on a number of individual competences. Details: Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University, Department of Organization, and Strategy, 2010. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Master Thesis: Accessed July 11, 2011 at: http://www.rpcgelderland-midden.nl/uploads/tx_rpcinfo/Onderzoek_-_het_verbeteren_van_kennisdeling_in_PPSen.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Netherlands URL: http://www.rpcgelderland-midden.nl/uploads/tx_rpcinfo/Onderzoek_-_het_verbeteren_van_kennisdeling_in_PPSen.pdf Shelf Number: 122018 Keywords: Cargo Theft (Netherlands)CollaborationPublic-Private PartnershipsTheftTransport IndustryTransport TheftTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11 Summary: The events of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government policies and structures to confront homeland security threats. Most notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in 2003 with key missions that included preventing terrorist attacks from occurring in the United States, and minimizing the damages from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,000 products on DHS's operations in such areas as border and transportation security and emergency management, among others. As requested, this report addresses DHS's progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts. This report is based on GAO's past and ongoing work, supplemented with DHS Office of Inspector General reports, with an emphasis on reports issued since 2008. GAO also analyzed information provided by DHS in July and August 2011 on recent actions taken in response to prior work. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS's accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs. For example, DHS (1) issued plans to guide its efforts, such as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which provides a framework for homeland security, and the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles; (2) successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces, such as a federal screening workforce to assume security screening responsibilities at airports nationwide; and (3) created new programs and offices to implement its homeland security responsibilities, such as establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help coordinate efforts to address cybersecurity threats. Such accomplishments are noteworthy given that DHS has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning department while implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking that can take years to achieve. While DHS has made progress, its transformation remains high risk due to its management challenges. Examples of progress made and work remaining include: Border security. DHS implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the country by processing biometric and biographic information. However, DHS has not yet determined how to implement a biometric exit capability and has taken action to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States (individuals who legally entered the country but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission). Aviation security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program for screening airline passengers against terrorist watchlist records. DHS also developed new programs and technologies to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo. However, DHS does not yet have a plan for deploying checked baggage screening technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive detection requirements, a mechanism to verify the accuracy of data to help ensure that air cargo screening is being conducted at reported levels, or approved technology to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container. Emergency preparedness and response. DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness, and a Target Capabilities List to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework, and awards preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology. However, DHS needs to strengthen its efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards preparedness, and develop a long-term recovery structure to better align timing and involvement with state and local governments' capacity. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. DHS assessed risks posed by CBRN threats and deployed capabilities to detect CBRN threats. However, DHS should work to improve its coordination of CBRN risk assessments, and identify monitoring mechanisms for determining progress made in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy. GAO's work identified three themes at the foundation of DHS's challenges. This report contains no new recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-881: Accessed September 12, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Shelf Number: 122718 Keywords: Aviation SecurityCounter-TerrorismCyber SecurityHomeland Security (U.S.)ImmigrationMaritime SecurityRisk ManagementTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: Lord, Stephen M. Title: Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are Needed to Improve Security Summary: The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 in December 2009 underscores the need for effective aviation security programs. Aviation security remains a daunting challenge with hundreds of airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggage. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of aviation security initiatives. Two key layers of aviation security are (1) TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program designed to identify persons who may pose a security risk; and (2) airport perimeter and access controls security. This testimony provides information on the extent to which TSA has taken actions to validate the scientific basis of SPOT and strengthen airport perimeter security. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from September 2009 through September 2011 and selected updates in August and September 2011. To conduct the updates, GAO analyzed documents on TSA's progress in strengthening aviation security, among other things. DHS completed an initial study in April 2011 to validate the scientific basis of the SPOT program; however, additional work remains to fully validate the program. In May 2010, GAO reported that TSA deployed this program, which uses behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers, before determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. TSA officials said that SPOT was deployed in response to potential threats, such as suicide bombers, and was based on scientific research available at the time. TSA is pilot testing revised program procedures at Boston-Logan airport in which behavior detection officers will engage passengers entering screening in casual conversation to help determine suspicious behaviors. TSA plans to expand this pilot program in the fall of 2011. GAO recommended in May 2010 that DHS, as part of its validation study, assess the methodology to help ensure the validity of the SPOT program. DHS concurred and stated that the study included an independent review with a broad range of agencies and experts. The study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees. However, DHS's study was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. The study also noted that additional work was needed to comprehensively validate the program. TSA officials are assessing the actions needed to address the study's recommendations but do not have time frames for completing this work. In September 2009 GAO reported that since 2004 TSA has taken actions to strengthen airport perimeter and access controls security by, among other things, deploying a random worker screening program; however, TSA had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment or developed a national strategy. Specifically, TSA had not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the approximately 450 U.S. airports regulated for security by TSA in 2009. GAO recommended that TSA develop (1) a comprehensive risk assessment and evaluate the need to conduct airport vulnerability assessments nationwide and (2) a national strategy to guide efforts to strengthen airport security. DHS concurred and TSA stated that the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment, issued in July 2010, was to provide a comprehensive risk assessment of airport security. However, this assessment did not consider the potential vulnerabilities of airports to an insider attack--an attack from an airport worker with authorized access to secure areas. In August 2011, TSA reported that transportation security inspectors conduct vulnerability assessments annually at all commercial airports, including an evaluation of perimeter security. GAO has not yet assessed the extent to which inspectors consistently conduct vulnerability assessments. TSA also updated the Transportation Systems-Sector Specific Plan, which summarizes airport security program activities. However, the extent to which these activities were guided by measurable goals and priorities, among other things, was not clear. Providing such additional information would better address GAO's recommendation. GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen TSA's SPOT program and airport perimeter and access control security efforts. DHS and TSA generally concurred with the recommendations and have actions under way to address them. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-938T: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11938t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11938t.pdf Shelf Number: 122775 Keywords: Airport SecurityPassenger ScreeningTransportation Security |
Author: Title: TSA's Oversight of the Airport Badging Process Needs Improvement Summary: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for protecting the Nation’s transportation systems. This includes ensuring that employees working in secured airport areas are properly vetted and badged. The agency relies on designated airport operator employees to perform the badging application process. Our objective was to determine whether the TSA provides effective oversight for the issuance of airport security badges. Individuals who pose a threat may obtain airport badges and gain access to secured airport areas. We analyzed vetting data from 359 airport badging offices and identified badge holder records with omissions or inaccuracies pertaining to security threat assessment status, birthdates, and birthplaces. For example, of the badges were issued to individuals without a complete security threat assessment. These problems exist because TSA has designed and implemented only limited oversight of the application process. Specifically, the agency did not: Ensure that airport operators have quality assurance procedures for the badging application process; Ensure that airport operators provide training and tools to designated badge office employees; and Require its Transportation Security Inspectors to verify the airport data during their reviews. Consequently, the safety of airport workers, passengers, and aircraft is at risk due to the potential of inappropriate individuals obtaining airport badges. TSA concurred with five recommendations and partially concurred with one that will improve the effectiveness of safeguards over the badging process. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 34p. Source: Report OIG-11-95: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20110803172118-83003.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20110803172118-83003.pdf Shelf Number: 124040 Keywords: Airport SecurityEmployee FraudTransportation SecurityWorkplace Crime |
Author: Oceans Beyond Piracy, One Earth Future Foundation Title: The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 Summary: This report is One Earth Future Foundation’s (OEF) second assessment of the Economic Cost of Piracy. It estimates that Somali piracy cost between $6.6 and $6.9 billion in 2011. Our previous report on the Economic Cost of Piracy in 2010, estimated that piracy cost the world $7 - $12 billion. That initial report generated a significant amount of dialogue and feedback on the cost of piracy. This report is the result of extensive research conducted by OEF with the collaborative participation of multiple different stakeholders, and includes significant contributions made by commentators, experts, and others impacted by piracy. It assesses nine different direct cost factors, and is focused specifically on the economic impact of Somali piracy. While the report assesses the cost of piracy for the year of 2011, there were significant changes and developments in piracy throughout that year, and in many ways 2011 was the ‘tale of two years’: Overall, 2011 saw an increase in attacks by Somali pirates. This was driven by a rapid escalation in the number of hostages and hijackings in the first quarter of 2011. As expected, hijackings declined during the monsoon period. But in the last quarter of the year, the anticipated resurgence of piracy following the monsoon period did not eventuate. A number of factors may explain this pattern, including an extended period of monsoonal rough weather off the coast of Somalia, and the use of deterrence mechanisms such as private armed security. Other developing trends throughout the year included an altered re-routing model where ships transited close to the western Indian coastline (rather than around the Cape of Good Hope); and pirates’ changing use of mother ships from large vessels to smaller fishing boats. Further, 2011 saw a more aggressive response from military forces conducting counter-piracy missions in the region. The project finds that of the total costs of Somali piracy in 2011, the shipping industry bore over 80% of these costs, or between $5.3 and $5.5 billion. Details: Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2011. 62p. Source: Working Paper, One Earth Foundation: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 124078 Keywords: Costs of CrimeMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracy (Somalia)Transportation Security |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Carnage Interrupted: An Analysis of Fifteen Terrorist Plots Against Public Surface Transportation Summary: This report examines 13 terrorist plots against public surface transportation that were uncovered and foiled by authorities between 1997 and 2010 and two failed attempts to carry out attacks. Certainly, this is not the total universe of foiled or failed terrorist plots in these years, but they were selected on the basis of what is known about them and the accessibility of information. The report focuses on terrorist plots in the West. Seven of the 15 plots took place in the United States, and four occurred in the United Kingdom. These two countries figure prominently as targets of terrorism, and in addition, American and British officials have dealt with terrorist plots through publicized arrests and trials, which provide additional information. Although motive was not a criterion in the selection of the plots, all but one involve individuals or groups inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology of violent global jihad against the West. The exception is the 1997 Flatbush plot, in which two terrorists, both of whom had connections with Hamas, angered by events in Palestine, simply wanted to kill as many Jews as possible to express their opposition to U.S. support for Israel. Other sources suggest that the Flatbush plotters wanted to force the release of jailed Islamist terrorists in the United States, including Ramzi Yousef, who participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Sheik Omar Abdul-Rahman, who was convicted for his involvement in a plot to carry out additional bombings in New York. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San José State University, 2012. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: MTS Report 11-20: Accessed July 13, 2012 at: http://www.transweb.sjsu.edu/PDFs/research/2979-analysis-of-terrorist-plots-against-public-surface-transportation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.transweb.sjsu.edu/PDFs/research/2979-analysis-of-terrorist-plots-against-public-surface-transportation.pdf Shelf Number: 125611 Keywords: Public TransportationTerrorism (U.S.)TerrroristsTransportation Security |
Author: Ferrell, Christopher E. Title: Neighborhood Crime and Travel Behavior: An Investigation of the Influence of Neighborhood Crime Rates on Mode Choice - Phase II Summary: There are considerable environmental and public health benefits if people choose to walk, bicycle, or ride transit, instead of drive. However, little work has been done on the effects of neighborhood crimes on mode choice. Instinctively, we understand that the threats posed by possible criminal activity in one’s neighborhood can play a major role in the decision to drive, take transit, walk or ride a bicycle, but so far little empirical evidence supports this notion, let alone guides public infrastructure investments, land use planning, or the allocation of police services. This report--describing Phase 2 of a research study conducted for the Mineta Transportation Institute on crime and travel behavior – finds that high crime neighborhoods tend to discourage residents from walking or riding a bicycle. When comparing a high crime to a lower crime neighborhood the odds of walking over choosing auto decrease by 17.25 percent for work trips and 61 percent for non-work trips. For transit access to work trips, the odds of choosing walk/bike to a transit station over auto decrease by 48.1 percent. Transit trips, on the other hand, are affected by neighborhood crime levels in a similar way to auto trips, wherein high crime neighborhoods appear to encourage transit mode choice. The odds of taking transit over choosing auto increase by 17.25 percent for work trips and 164 percent for non-work trips. Surprised by this last finding, the research team tested two possible explanations for why high levels of neighborhood crime would increase transit use: 1) the mode choice models do not adequately account for the effects and interplay between urban form and crime levels and mode choice; and 2) people who ride in cars or take transit may feel more protected when riding in a vehicle (termed here, the “neighborhood exposure hypothesis”). To investigate the first explanation, the researchers tested a number of alternative urban form and crime interaction variables to no effect. Digging deeper into the second hypothesis, the researchers tested whether the access portion of transit trips (walking, bicycling, or driving to a transit stop) is sensitive to neighborhood crimes as well, wherein high crime neighborhoods discourage walking and bicycling and encourage driving to transit stations. The report provides evidence that high crime neighborhoods encourage driving to transit stops and discourage walking or bicycling, lending support to the neighborhood exposure hypothesis. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San José State University, 2012. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: MTI Report 11-04: Accessed July 13, 2012 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/PDFs/research/2802-Neighborhood-Crime-Travel-Mode-Behavior.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/PDFs/research/2802-Neighborhood-Crime-Travel-Mode-Behavior.pdf Shelf Number: 125613 Keywords: Neighborhooda and Crime; Travel BehaviorPublic TransportationTransportation Security |
Author: Rohlich, Nina Title: Exploring the Effectiveness of Transit Security Awareness Campaigns in the San Francisco Bay Area Summary: Public involvement in alerting officials of suspicious and potentially harmful activity is critical to the overall security of a transit system. As part of an effort to get passengers and the public involved, many transit agencies have security awareness campaigns. The objective of this research is to learn how transit agencies seek to make security awareness campaigns effective and explore how they measure the effectiveness of such campaigns, if at all. This research project includes data from case studies of five major agencies that provide transit service in the San Francisco Bay Area region. The case study data are comprised of descriptions of the types of security awareness campaigns the agencies have implemented, the goals of the campaigns, and how they seek to make their campaigns effective, as well as whether and how these agencies measure and determine the effectiveness of their campaigns. A positive finding of this research is the consistency with which Bay Area transit organizations address the need for passenger awareness as part of their overall security program. However, none of the five agencies analyzed for this study measures the effectiveness of their campaigns. Whereas they all have a similar goal—to increase passenger awareness about security issues—little evidence exists confirming to what extent they are achieving this goal. The paper concludes with suggestions for using outcome measurements to provide a reasonable indication of a campaign’s effectiveness by capturing the public’s response to a campaign. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San Jose State University, 2010. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: MTI Report 09-19: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/research/publications/documents/2914_09-19.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/research/publications/documents/2914_09-19.pdf Shelf Number: 125656 Keywords: Media CampaignsPublic Transportation (California)Publicity CampaignsTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Explosives and Incendiaries Used in Terrorist Attacks on Public Surface Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Examination Summary: This report provides data on terrorist attacks against public surface transportation targets and serious crimes committed against such targets throughout the world. The data are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, which is expanded and updated as information becomes available. This analysis is based on the database as of February 20, 2010. Data include the frequency and lethality with which trains, buses, and road and highway targets are attacked; the relationship between fatalities and attacks against those targets; and the relationship between injuries and attacks against them. The report presents some preliminary observations drawn from the data that can help stakeholder governments, transit managers, and employee to focus on the ways the most frequent and/or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San Jose State University, 2010. 118p. Source: Internet Resource: MTI Report WP 09-02: Accessed July 18, 2012 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/research/publications/documents/2875-IED-Support-Research.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/research/publications/documents/2875-IED-Support-Research.pdf Shelf Number: 125667 Keywords: ExplosivesPublic TransportationTerrorism (U.S.)Transportation Security |
Author: London. Assembly. Transport Committee Title: Crime and Disorder on London's Buses Summary: There is less than one crime for every 50,000 passenger journeys on London’s buses, and yet evidence suggests that people feel less safe on them than on any other form of the capital’s public transport. TfL’s own research and responses to our investigation suggest some bus passengers are fearful of crime and intimidated by anti-social behaviour. The reasons for the apparent difference between actual levels of crime and the fear of it are complex. One reason is that recent reductions in crime on buses have not yet had an effect on people’s perceptions of it. Figures provided to the Committee by TfL show bus related crime increased in absolute terms and per passenger journey between 2004 and 2006. There have also been changes to the passenger experience. There has also been an increase of 22.5 per cent in ridership on the bus network since 2002, with nearly two billion passenger journeys last year. The introduction of Oyster cards, whilst increasing the ease and speed of boarding a bus, has reduced contact between staff and passengers; an important factor in passengers’ perceptions of safety. The police and many of those who submitted views to our investigation identified the introduction of free travel on buses for under-16s as a factor in the levels of crime and perceptions of it. Most young people behave responsibly on buses and are more likely to be victims of crime than any other group. However, subsequent policy decisions by TfL and the allocation of police resources suggest the potential effect of the free travel policy on other bus passengers was not adequately considered at the time. We welcome many of the recent initiatives introduced by TfL to increase the uniformed presence on buses and use technology to prevent and solve crime. We have examined these in detail and have made a number of recommendations intended to improve further the way technology and uniformed staff are used to police the bus network. In doing so we have sought to identify lessons that could be learned from best practice elsewhere on the transport network. In particular, we propose: • Increasing the uniformed presence on the bus network using as best practice the example of the DLR where more than six times as much money is spent on security staff than in parts of the capital’s bus network • Exploring the potential for integrating the roles of revenue protection inspectors and Safer Transport Teams • Using the new i-Bus system to ensure that new technology is exploited to explore the potential for live CCTV feeds and better use of PA systems to improve communication between drivers and passengers • Measures to help drivers maintain order and a pleasant environment for bus passengers. Crime and anti-social behaviour will always impinge on the transport network of a large city; it is the responsibility of all relevant public bodies to minimise the extent to which this happens. Our report aims to make a positive contribution to assisting TfL and the police to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour on buses and thereby enhancing the passenger experience. Details: London: London Assembly Transport Committee, 2008. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2012 at: http://legacy.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/transport/crime-disorder-buses.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://legacy.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/transport/crime-disorder-buses.pdf Shelf Number: 125967 Keywords: BusesPassengersTransit Crime (London)Transit SafetyTransportation CrimeTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: TSA Explosives Detection Canine Program: Actions Needed to Analyze Data and Ensure Canine Teams Are Effectively Utilized Summary: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal agency that administers the National Canine Program (NCP), is collecting and using key data on its canine program, but could better analyze these data to identify program trends. TSA collects canine team data using the Canine Website System (CWS), a central management database. TSA uses CWS to capture the amount of time canine teams conduct training as well as searching for explosives odor, among other functions. However, TSA has not fully analyzed the data it collects in CWS to identify program trends and areas that are working well or in need of corrective action. Such analyses could help TSA to determine canine teams’ proficiency, inform future deployment efforts, and help ensure that taxpayer funds are used effectively. For example: • GAO analysis of canine team training data from May 2011 through April 2012 showed that some canine teams were repeatedly not in compliance with TSA’s monthly training requirement, which is in place to ensure canine teams remain proficient in explosives detection. • GAO analysis of TSA’s cargo-screening data from September 2011 through July 2012 showed that canine teams primarily responsible for screening air cargo placed on passenger aircraft exceeded their monthly screening requirement. This suggests that TSA could increase the percentage of air cargo it requires air cargo canine teams to screen or redeploy teams. TSA has not deployed passenger screening canines (PSC)—trained to identify and track explosives odor on a person—consistent with its risk-based approach, and did not determine PSC teams’ effectiveness prior to deployment. TSA’s 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, GAO found that PSC teams have not been deployed to the highest-risk airport locations. TSA officials stated that the agency generally defers to airport officials on whether PSC teams will be deployed, and some airport operators have decided against the use of PSC teams at their airports because of concerns related to the composition and capabilities of PSC teams. As a result of these concerns, the PSC teams deployed to higher-risk airport locations are not being used for passenger screening as intended, but for other purposes, such as screening air cargo or training. TSA is coordinating with aviation stakeholders to resolve concerns related to PSC team deployment, but has been unable to resolve these concerns, as of September 2012. Furthermore, TSA began deploying PSC teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational effectiveness and before identifying where within the airport these teams would be most effectively utilized. TSA is in the process of assessing the effectiveness of PSC teams in the operational environment, but testing is not comprehensive since it does not include all areas at the airport or compare PSCs with already deployed conventional canines (trained to detect explosives in stationary objects). As a result, more comprehensive testing could provide TSA with greater assurance that PSC teams are effective in identifying explosives odor on passengers and provide an enhanced security benefit. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-239: Accessed March 25, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651725.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651725.pdf Shelf Number: 128126 Keywords: Canine UnitsPassenger ScreeningPolice Dogs (U.S.)Transportation Security |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV (High-Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage Attempts Summary: On August 26, 1995, the Saturday of the final and busiest weekend of France's summer holiday season, terrorists attempted to derail the TGV (Train a Grande Vitesse) between Lyon and Paris by planting a bomb. Fortunately, their crude triggering mechanism failed to detonate the bomb, and subsequent analysis indicates that even had the bomb gone off, the explosion would not have derailed the train. The TGV episode, one of a continuing series of case studies by the Mineta Transportation Institute, points to a continuing problem: Since 1995, terrorists have attempted to derail trains on at least 144 occasions. Because of the expansion of high-speed rail systems in Europe, Asia, and North America, where 15 high-speed rail projects are in preparation or under way in the United States alone, this case study has been expanded to include a chronology and statistical analysis of attempted derailments worldwide. This analysis examines the geographic distribution of the attempts, the methods used by the saboteurs, and the outcomes. Although based on a small universe of events, it underscores both the attractiveness to terrorists of attacking transportation systems-a successful attack can result in high body counts, significant disruption, dramatic images, and enormous publicity, all things sought by terrorists-and the difficulties of achieving success. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San Jose State University, 2010. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: MTI Report 09-12: Accessed March 28, 2014 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/TGV_book%20(with%20covers).pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/TGV_book%20(with%20covers).pdf Shelf Number: 132014 Keywords: BombingsRailroadsTerrorismTrainsTransit CrimeTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Cruise Vessels: Most Required Security and Safety Measures have Been Implemented, but Concerns Remain About Crime Reporting Summary: In 2011, almost 11 million passengers took a cruise from a U.S. port. Media reports about passenger personal safety while aboard cruise vessels-including those related to the January 2012 grounding of the cruise vessel Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy, which resulted in 32 deaths-combined with the increasing number of passengers taking cruises has raised questions about passenger safety and security. With the enactment of the CVSSA in 2010, cruise vessels that visit U.S. ports were required to meet certain security and safety requirements, such as having rail heights of at least 42 inches and reporting allegations of certain crimes to the FBI. GAO was asked to review cruise vessel safety as well as security issues-related to keeping passengers safe from crime. GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the cruise vessel industry and federal agencies have implemented the CVSSA, and (2) any actions taken following the Costa Concordia accident to enhance the safety of cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports. GAO reviewed the CVSSA and related agency and industry documents, and interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, FBI, CLIA, five cruise lines which accounted for over 80 percent of North American cruise vessel passengers in 2012, and two crime victim advocacy groups. The cruise lines were selected based on several factors including their volume of North American passengers. Crime victim advocacy groups were selected based on their knowledge about cruise ship crime issues. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-43: Accessed April 24, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659897.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659897.pdf Shelf Number: 132158 Keywords: Crime StatisticsCruise VesselsTouristsTransit CrimeTransportation Security |
Author: Nakanishi, Yuko, Consultant Title: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault Summary: This synthesis report addresses the important issue of protecting bus operators from passenger assault. The key elements of the synthesis study included a survey of transit agencies with a 75% (66/88) response rate, profiles of security practices, and a literature summary. Although serious crime in transit systems is relatively rare and constitutes a small percentage of overall crime, even one serious incident of violence can make media headlines and diminish the perception of security, especially if the crime is against the transit operator. Assaults on operators have caused worker absence, productivity issues, and increased levels of stress for the victim and for coworkers. Minor incidents can be precursors to more serious violence against operators. Therefore, it is important that transit agencies address the issue of operator assaults before they become problematic. "Assault" of a bus operator is defined broadly in this synthesis and includes acts of aggression that may or may not cause physical injury to the operator. Assault is defined as: Overt physical and verbal acts by a passenger that interfere with the mission of a bus operator-to complete his or her scheduled run safely-and that adversely affect the safety of the operator and customers. Bus operator protection measures ranging from policing, personnel, and training to technology, information management, policy, and legislation were identified and explored in this synthesis study. Transit agencies face different challenges and problems, along with different sets of institutional, legal, and budgetary constraints; these issues typically are considered when agencies select and implement security measures. Some measures are more appropriate for preventing certain types of attacks. For instance, conflict mitigation training is appropriate for reducing assaults emanating from disputes, whereas barriers may be more useful in protecting the operator against spontaneous attacks. Some measures, such as emergency communications and vehicle location technologies, focus on improving incident response. Video surveillance is useful for deterrence as well as for identification and prosecution of assailants. Audio surveillance is especially useful in addressing verbal attacks and threats. Agencies have helped to enact legislation on enhanced penalties for operator assault and have established agency policies such as suspending service for violating transit agency rules. The characteristics of assailants also influence the protection method. If most are teenagers, a school outreach program may mitigate assaults. If gang-related assaults are increasing, close cooperation with local law enforcement could be key. The synthesis survey requested respondents to describe their bus system and security characteristics; their policies on fare and rules enforcement; characteristics of bus operator assaults; and their assault prevention and mitigation practices, including training, hiring, use of officers and patrols, technology, and self-defense tools and training. The survey was distributed to 88 multimodal and bus-only transit agencies representing large, medium, and small U.S. agencies; the survey was also sent to several Canadian agencies and to one Chinese bus rapid transit system. Survey respondents represented large, medium, and small agencies and were geographically diverse. In general, the primary security provider for the respondents was local, county, or state or provincial police; more than a third used a combination of security providers. Respondents that indicated having transit police departments were generally large or midsize agencies. Practically all agencies have a standard operating procedure in place for response to bus operator assaults. About half of the survey respondents stated that their local laws provided more severe punishments for assaults against bus operators than for some other assaults. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2011. 136p. Source: Internet Resource: TCRP Synthesis 93: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.tcrponline.org/PDFDocuments/tsyn93.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.tcrponline.org/PDFDocuments/tsyn93.pdf Shelf Number: 132668 Keywords: AssaultsBusesCrime PreventionTransit CrimeTransit SecurityTransportation SecurityWorkplace CrimeWorkplace Violence |
Author: Schulz, Dorothy Moses Title: Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies Summary: Previous TCRP reports, notably Electronic Surveillance Technologies on Transit Vehicles (Maier and Malone 2001) and Transit Security Update (Nakanishi 2009), have studied overall security and the use of electronic video surveillance technology in the transit environment. Improving Transit Security (Needle and Cobb 1997) and Guidelines for the Effective Use of Uniformed Transit Police and Security Personnel (Interactive Elements Inc. 1997) considered how transit agencies were using video surveillance as part of their overall security strategies, primarily in conjunction with uniformed patrol by police or security officers. Most of the examples and case studies in earlier reports combined discussions of the use of electronic video surveillance cameras in bus and rail systems and few considered nonsecurity uses of such technology. This synthesis differs from the earlier ones in several ways. It is the first synthesis to document the current use of electronic video surveillance technology solely by passenger rail agencies and to consider the totality of its use, including onboard railcars and along the right-of-way (ROW). The synthesis also describes current administrative policies on monitoring video images either in real time or for post-event analysis; policies on archiving and storing images and access to them by employees, other public agencies (primarily police), and the general public; and funding sources for installing new or upgrading existing video surveillance systems. Results of a survey emailed to passenger rail agencies throughout the United States are used to document important issues, including the following: - The percentage of stations, station platforms, or shelters where surveillance is employed and how decisions are made on which locations to cover. - The percentage of railcars in which onboard surveillance is employed and how decisions are made on which vehicles to cover. - Whether video surveillance is employed along the ROW and, if so, where. - The type of video surveillance systems in use and any special features they may utilize. - Policies pertaining to monitoring, recording, and archiving images, including chain of custody policies. - Purposes other than for crime/vandalism prevention for which surveillance is employed and its perceived effectiveness for those applications. - Whether patrons or employees have been surveyed regarding their perceptions of security and, if so, what those perceptions are. - Funding sources for installing and/or upgrading electronic video surveillance systems. - Existing plans for installing video surveillance systems in new vehicles or stations. Forty-three completed surveys were received from the 58 passenger rail agencies to which questionnaires were sent, a response rate of 73%. Five agencies were selected as case study sites because they reflected a variety of modes, had different security configurations (transit police or reliance on local agencies), and were upgrading their systems to include technologies that other agencies are likely to be considering. These agencies provided opportunities to share information in a lessons-learned format. Agencies that did not employ surveillance technology were encouraged to complete the survey by answering two brief questions: (1) whether the agency was considering installing a surveillance system and, if so, where, or (2) whether the agency was not considering installing a surveillance system and, if so, why not. All the responding agencies employed video surveillance in some capacity. Although the authors cannot speak for agencies that did not respond, it is reasonable to say that all passenger rail transit agencies make at least some use of electronic video surveillance on their property. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2011. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: TCRP Synthesis 90: Accessed July 16, 2014 at: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_syn_90.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_syn_90.pdf Shelf Number: 132681 Keywords: Crime PreventionTrainsTransit CrimeTransit SafetyTransportation SecurityVideo Surveillance |
Author: Brown, Radhika Title: Getting Safety on Track. Expanding Edmonton's LRT Design Guidelines to Improve Women's Perceptions of Safety at Transit Stations Summary: People base their travel choices on their perceptions of personal safety in environments such as transit stations. Women are more likely to perceive public spaces as threatening and they use public transit more than men, to access fundamental needs such as employment, childcare, education and healthcare. Effective design can reduce crime and fear by creating defensible spaces that assert ownership, and offer opportunities for natural surveillance. This is the underlying concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Creating transit stations that make users feel safe could potentially increase use of public transit among women, particularly at off-peak hours. Identifying elements that affect women's feelings of safety in suburban (non-central) surface LRT stations in Edmonton can guide future station development, and reduce experiences of fear in existing stations for a safer and more inclusive transit system. The aim of this study is to determine how the City of Edmonton can better address women's safety in suburban (non-central) surface LRT stations through expanding their existing design guidelines to incorporate both CPTED guidelines as well as additional elements addressed by the safety audit checklist provided in the City of Edmonton's Safety Audit Guide for Crime Prevention (2000). The main questions guiding research are: 1. In what ways do the City of Edmonton's existing LRT Design Guidelines for Edmonton Transit System (ETS) incorporate CPTED guidelines, if at all? 2. What are the similarities and differences between the CPTED guidelines and the criteria that enhance safety in public spaces as noted in the Safety Audit Guide for Crime Prevention developed by the City of Edmonton, which is based on the Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children (METRAC) Women's Safety Audit Guide? 3. How can the City of Edmonton's LRT Design Guidelines be expanded to enhance women's safety at above-ground suburban light-rail transit stations? The research involved a review of the published literature on gendered fear of crime in public spaces, the relationship of the built environment to perceptions of safety, and situational crime prevention. This was followed by a document review of the City of Edmonton's LRT Design Guidelines for Edmonton Transit System (ETS) (2011), as well as CPTED guidelines from the existing literature. A safety audit was undertaken using the a slightly modified version of the Checklist of Safety Audit for Crime Prevention in the City of Edmonton's Safety Audit Guide for Crime Prevention (2000). The key CPTED principles of natural surveillance, territorial definition, compatible building placement, and building form formed the broad framework under which the specific concerns addressed by the safety audit were classified. The findings of the safety audits conducted at Clareview and Century Park stations showed that there had been some, but not full, integration of CPTED principles in the design and upkeep of these stations. The newer Century Park station benefitted from the transparency resulting from the extensive use of glass in the building, and offered better natural surveillance opportunities than the older Clareview station which used concrete and had no windows on the lower level. Century Park was also noticeably better-maintained than Clareview, where signs of vandalism, disrepair, and poor maintenance contributed to feelings of insecurity. Both stations were fairly isolated at night, due to lack of activity-generating land uses in the immediate area of the station. The findings of the safety audit emphasize the importance of natural surveillance and territorial definition (maintenance and defensibility of space) in creating feelings of safety in transit users. Recommendations were formulated based on the findings of the safety audits: Conduct safety audits at all LRT stations. The results of these safety audits could then inform the design of future LRT stations in the expanding network, and provide a CPTED framework that is better tailored to the specific opportunities and challenges of the Edmonton transit system. Details: Kingston, ONT: School of Urban and Regional Planning, Queen's University, 2013. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/8328/1/Brown_Radhika_201309_MPL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Canada URL: http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/8328/1/Brown_Radhika_201309_MPL.pdf Shelf Number: 134081 Keywords: Crime PreventionCrime Prevention Through Environmental DesignDesign Against CrimeFear of CrimeTransit Crime (Canada)Transit SafetyTransportation Security |
Author: Frazier, Ernest Ron, Sr. Title: Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems Summary: Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems explores the current state of practice and identifies and responds to the specific challenges and issues associated with the security of small- and medium-sized transit agencies. The report follows the five stages of protection activity (prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) by providing baseline options and identifying potential security countermeasures that could be deployed by both of these sizes of transit agencies Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2015. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_180.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_180.pdf Shelf Number: 136282 Keywords: Public Transportation Transit Crime Transit Safety Transportation Security |
Author: Plant, Jeremy F. Title: Securing and Protecting America's Railroad System: U.S. Railroad and Opportunities for Terrorist Threats Summary: On any given day, thousands of trains move across the American landscape. Each one of them presents a potential threat to the safety of individuals and families, to the continued functioning of our communities and our economy, and to the life of our great cities. Whether carrying millions of workers to and from their jobs, or providing the safest means of transporting hazardous materials, or bringing food and agricultural necessities to consumers, railroads pose an inviting target to would-be terrorists. Yet no significant act of terrorism has been directed against U. S. railroads, and we lack hard information on the nature of the terrorist risks involved in rail transport. This report highlights the potential threats, examines the response of government and the rail industry to the post-9/11 security responsibilities, and suggests ways in which public policy and rail operations can be better directed to meet the challenges of security in an age of terrorist activity. Efforts to secure the nation's rail system have been undertaken by federal, state, and local government agencies and by private rail operators. These activities differ fundamentally between the passenger and freight modes. Driven by events such as the Madrid and London rail attacks, and by the assumption that since the 9/11/01 events all passenger modes of travel in the U.S. constitute potential terrorist targets, passenger rail security has been largely entrusted to the public sector, albeit with less attention and fewer resources granted for passenger rail security than for aviation. Freight rail security has also been driven by events but has been guided by the private sector rail industry. Resources currently directed to rail security are inadequate, given the potential for catastrophic loss of life or economic disruption from attacks on the rail system. The growing use of rail systems for work-related passenger travel and the critical role played by freight railroads in U.S. and global commerce makes insuring their security a matter of urgent public concern. While the efforts to secure the system led by the Department of Homeland Security represent a good start in tackling the issues, legislation specifically dealing with rail security is needed to identify the threats, clarify the roles of the various public and private actors, and establish a level of funding commensurate with the importance of the rail system and the potential loss of life and economic damage that might result from terrorist attacks. In addition to prevention, the rail system plays or can play an important role in mitigation and recovery efforts after man-made or natural disasters. Details: Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania State University Harrisburg, 2007. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2015 at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9059&rep=rep1&type=pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9059&rep=rep1&type=pdf Shelf Number: 136985 Keywords: Homeland SecurityRailroadsTerrorismTransit CrimeTransit SafetyTransportation Security |
Author: Victoria (Australia). Auditor General Title: Public Safety on Victoria's Train System Summary: Public transport services, and in particular trains, play a significant role in the community. Passengers should feel safe as they use these services regardless of the time of day or night. The protective services officers (PSO) program was established to reduce crime and improve perceptions of safety on Melbourne's train system. Perceptions of the safety of the metropolitan train system at night have improved since the start of the PSO program, but the extent to which this can be attributed to the presence of PSOs is unknown. It is also not possible to assess whether PSOs have had any impact on crime on the metropolitan train system. Advice provided to government to support decisions on the establishment and deployment of the PSO program was comprehensive, however, performance monitoring has been limited. Victoria Police does not have an effective performance monitoring regime in place to support ongoing development or future advice on the program's efficiency or effectiveness. Additionally, there is an opportunity to drive greater awareness of the presence of PSOs, further improving perceptions of safety and increasing patronage. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/publications/20160224-Public-Safety/20160224-Public-Safety.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/publications/20160224-Public-Safety/20160224-Public-Safety.pdf Shelf Number: 137972 Keywords: Public TransportTrainsTransit CrimeTransit SafetyTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Aviation Security: Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Would Benefit from Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates Summary: Why GAO Did This Study Incidents of aviation workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons and drugs into security-restricted areas and onto planes has heightened awareness about security at commercial airports. TSA, along with airport operators, has responsibility for securing the nation's approximately 440 commercial airports. GAO was asked to review TSA's oversight of airport perimeter and access control security since GAO last reported on the topic in 2009. This report examines, for airport security, (1) the extent to which TSA has assessed the components of risk and (2) the extent to which TSA has taken actions to oversee and facilitate security, among other objectives. GAO examined TSA documents related to risk assessment and security activities; analyzed relevant TSA security event data from fiscal years 2009 through 2015; obtained information from TSA and industry association officials as well as from a non-generalizable sample of 11 airports, selected based on factors such as size. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations, including that TSA update its Risk Assessment of Airport Security, develop and implement a method for conducting a system-wide assessment of airport vulnerability, and update its National Strategy for Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions to address the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-632: Accessed May 31, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677586.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677586.pdf Shelf Number: 139249 Keywords: Airport SecurityAviation SecurityDrug TraffickingRisk AssessmentSmugglingTransportation Security |
Author: Policy Research Corporation Title: The impact of 100% scanning of U.S.-bound containers on maritime transport Summary: On the 3rd of August 2007 former President Bush signed into law the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act which requires the scanning of all U.S.-bound containers by radiation detection and non-intrusive inspection equipment at a foreign port before being loaded on a vessel. At the European Commission level it was agreed to prepare a "long-term assessment of the impact of 100% scanning in order to be ready for the discussion with the new U.S. Congress and administration". The study ‘The impact of 100% scanning of U.S.-bound containers’ was awarded to Policy Research Corporation and analyzes the impact of the obligation of 100% scanning of U.S.- bound containers before shipping: - on port facilities and ports, including their competitiveness; - on transport towards ports and on adjacent regions; - and finally also on the U.S. production using components shipped via European ports. The study started in October 2008 with an extensive literature search, in particular legal documents and papers considering the operation and economic impact of the 100% scanning rule. In a second phase data collection was combined with a series of interviews and field trips, directed to Port Authorities, Terminal Operating Companies, transport operators, professional associations, forwarders and any other stakeholders. For these interviews and field trips a selection was made of 14 European ports including the main U.S.-bound containerized cargo. Details: Antwerp: European Commission, Directorate-General Energy and Transport, 2009. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/security/studies/doc/2009_04_scanning_containers.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/security/studies/doc/2009_04_scanning_containers.pdf Shelf Number: 147790 Keywords: Cargo SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime TransportShipping IndustryTransportation Security |
Author: Volinski, Joel M. Title: Addressing Difficult Customer Situations: A Synthesis of Transit Practice Summary: Addressing Difficult Customer Situations explores issues surrounding difficult customers or passengers and the variety of circumstances that can arise when they utilize transit system facilities or vehicles. The report identifies current practices used by transit agencies to prevent, prepare for, and deal with these incidents. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2017. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: TCRP Synthesis 127: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://www.nap.edu/download/24701 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.nap.edu/download/24701 Shelf Number: 141296 Keywords: PassengersPublic TransportationTransit CrimeTransportation SafetyTransportation Security |
Author: Butterworth, Bruce Robert Title: Security Awareness for Public Bus Transportation: Case Studies of Attacks Against the Israeli Public Bus System Summary: This report presents 16 case studies of attacks planned or carried out against Israeli bus targets, along with statistical data on the number, frequency, and lethality of attacks against bus targets that have taken place in Israel since 1970 and during the Second Intifada, which occurred between September 2000 and the end of 2006. The statistical data come from MTI's Database on Terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation. The report also includes an analysis of the effectiveness of different improvised explosive devices and methods of delivering them and raises questions for future discussion. The case studies of bus attacks were selected not because they are statistically representative, but because they provide a variety of interesting observations. They include both lethal and nonlethal attacks, attacks in which security measures were effective or were not followed or were ineffective, and attacks in which the attackers' tactics and/or devices were lethal or failed or reduced the lethality of the attack. It is hoped that the cases presented in this report and the accompanying analysis will increase understanding of what can happen and of what can deter, prevent, and/or mitigate the occurrence of terrorist attacks against public bus systems. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San Jose State University, 2012. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: MTI Report 11-07: Accessed March 28, 2014 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/PDFs/research/2978-israeli-bus-public-transportation-attacks.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Israel URL: Internet Resource: MTI Report 11-07: Accessed March 28, 2014 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/PDFs/research/2978-israeli-bus-public-transportation-attacks.pdf Shelf Number: 132010 Keywords: Buses Explosives Public Transportation Suicide Attacks Terrorism Transportation Security |
Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Crime on public transport Summary: Crime on public transport in London is falling. The overall number of crimes across TfL's public transport network is on a downward trend, and the risk of being a victim of crime is also down. However, a rise in violence against the person and sexual offences is a challenge. Fear of crime on public transport can prevent people from using the public transport system. While there is no direct correlation between reported crime levels and fear of crime, passengers often perceive their risk of crime to be higher than official crime statistics indicate, and reducing actual levels of crime may not lead to a reduction in people's perception of crime risk. However, under-reporting masks the full extent of crime on the public transport system and anti-social behaviour, which is rarely reported, can also act as a deterrent to travel for some. Tackling crime and anti-social behaviour on public transport The task of preventing crime on public transport is shared between Transport for London (TfL), London's policing agencies, operating companies and other agencies that work to improve the safety and security of passengers, staff and local communities. Crime on public transport is tackled in a number of different ways. The Mayor argues that the reduction of crime on public transport is as a result of continued investment in policing and the use of effective problem solving and innovative tactics. High visibility patrols, joint problem solving activity, and reactive investigation of offences were cited to us as key. It is recognised that there will be future challenges, and that more will be needed than just new policing skills. Resources need to focus on more advanced crime reduction, problem solving and engagement activity; stopping crime and managing offenders; and the use of innovative equipment, such as body-worn video cameras; enhanced CCTV coverage and handheld mobile devices. Successful policing depends on effective communication and joint working with partners. Our investigation heard that partnership working is strong. However, perception of the police and TfL's response to crime and anti-social behaviour has declined marginally year on year for all modes of transport. This is a concern and the introduction of better ways to report crimes might boost public confidence. Details: London: Greater London Authority, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 8, 2017 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/crime_on_public_transport.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/crime_on_public_transport.pdf Shelf Number: 148080 Keywords: Transit Crime Transit Safety Transportation Security |
Author: Smith, Gwen Chisholm Title: Legal Implications of Video Surveillance on Transit Systems Summary: TRB's Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Legal Research Digest 52: Legal Implications of Video Surveillance on Transit Systems explores the use of video surveilance systems on buses, trains, and stations. The widespread use of such video surveillance systems has generated numerous legal issues, such as a system's ability to utilize video to discipline union and non-union employees, safety issues associated with such use, public access to such video, and retention policies regarding video, among others. This digest explores federal and state laws to address these issues, along with the current practices employed by transit agencies to comply with those laws. Details: Washington, DC: Transit Cooperative Research Program, 2018. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Legal Research Digest 52: Accessed June 30, 2018 at: https://www.nap.edu/download/25055 Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.nap.edu/download/25055 Shelf Number: 1500747 Keywords: PrivacyTransit CrimeTransit SystemsTransportationTransportation Safety Transportation SecurityVideo Surveillance |
Author: Lockwood, Stephen Title: Guide for Emergency Transportation Operations Summary: This sixth volume of NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security is designed to assist transportation agencies in adopting the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The objective of Volume 6: Guide for Emergency Transportation Operations is to support the development of a formal program for the improved management of traffic incidents, natural disasters, security events, and other emergencies on the highway system. This report outlines a coordinated, performance-oriented, all-hazard approach called Emergency Transportation Operations. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2005. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 21, 2019 at: https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13857/guide-for-emergency-transportation-operations Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: https://www.trbtss.org/?p=2223 Shelf Number: 154340 Keywords: Emergency Transportation Major Events Natural Disasters Security Operations Special Events Security Surface Transportation Traffic Incidents Transportation Security |
Author: Greenberger, Michael Title: The Need for Closed Circuit Television in Mass Transit Systems Summary: Abstract Closed circuit television video (CCTV) surveillance systems need to be introduced or enhanced in the public areas within United States' mass transit systems. London's extensive system was used very successfully in the investigation of the July 2005 terrorist attacks on its subway and bus systems. That effective investigatory use of CCTV is very likely to be a significant deterrence to future terrorist activities on London mass transit. The United States must be prepared in the event of similar attacks on its soil. As roughly twenty times more people travel by mass transit than by air, it is time for this nation's transportation security focus to shift to mass transit, and to use CCTV widely in public mass transit systems. Details: Bethesda, Maryland: University of Maryland, Center for Health and Homeland Security, 2006. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2019 at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/64/ Year: 2006 Country: International URL: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=fac_pubs Shelf Number: 154291 Keywords: Bus Closed Circuit Television Video (CCTV) Deterrence Mass Transit Public Transportation Subway Terrorist Attacks Transportation Security |
Author: BSI Title: BSI and TT Club Cargo Theft: Report H1 2018 Summary: BSI and TT Club have authored this report to demonstrate their shared goal of educating the transportation and manufacturing sectors about the dynamic cargo theft risks present across the globe. With the enhanced awareness of cargo crime trends across the globe, industry will be able to engage in a proactive approach in preventing cargo crime and also minimizing the financial loss and brand reputation damage that results from cargo crime. Details: Scottsdale, Arizona: BSI, 2018. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2019 at: https://www.ttclub.com/fileadmin/uploads/tt-club/Documents/BSI_TT_ClubCargoTheftReportH1_2018_FinalRev.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.ttclub.com/loss-prevention/publications/tt-club-bsi-cargo-theft-report-h1-2018/ Shelf Number: 156346 Keywords: Cargo Crime Cargo Theft Transport Security Transportation Security |
Author: Transported Asset Protection Association Title: United States and Canada Annual Cargo Theft Report Summary: TAPA Americas collects, records, analyzes and reports on cargo theft data for the United States, Canada, Mexico and Brazil through the Incident Information System (IIS). The IIS will issue separate reports for Mexico, Brazil, and U.S./Canada. While quite comprehensive in the United States, cargo theft data collection for Canada is still being developed and will be provided when available. For a theft incident to be recorded in the IIS system, the following data points must be known: Mode, Product category, Location. Based on theft incidents reported to the IIS that met the above-stated criteria, TAPA recorded 649 theft incidents in the United States for 2017, a decrease of 15% from each of the 2016 and 2015 totals. As with other cargo theft reports, the TAPA IIS Annual Report is designed to provide TAPA members with a snapshot of cargo theft in the United States, along with an understanding of trends that affect supply chain security programs for its membership. In order to enhance the TAPA IIS Annual Report, Modi Operandi and other trends prominently seen throughout the year will be focused on, with anecdotes and case studies provided as available. Details: Boca Raton, Florida: Transported Asset Protection Association, 2017. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2019 at: https://tapa.memberclicks.net/assets/docs/IIS/2017_IIS_Reports/TAPA_US_2017_Annual.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://tapa.memberclicks.net/assets/docs/IIS/2017_IIS_Reports/TAPA_US_2017_Annual.pdf Shelf Number: 156347 Keywords: Cargo Theft Freight Industry Supply Chain Theft of Goods Transportation Security |
Author: Shepherd, Marv Title: Pharmaceutical Cargo Theft: Uncovering the True Costs Summary: The purpose of this study was to find out more about pharmaceutical cargo theft. In particular, this research explored the full extent of this kind of theft, as well as the other or tangential costs associated with it. The study identified indirect costs and other cost factors, ranked their importance and identified the frequency of occurrence. Using this data and the opinions of those that participated in the survey, the researchers established an estimation of the total cost in dollars associated with these factors. Details: Beverly, Massachusetts: Sensitech United Technologies, 2015. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 18, 2019 at: http://files.sensitech.com/sensitech/nl/contentimages/SEN2162-PharmaCostsReport-Oct29-1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.sensitech.com/nl/resources/white-papers/ Shelf Number: 156390 Keywords: Costs of Crime Pharmaceutical Cargo Theft Supply Chain Security Theft Transportation Security |
Author: Bruls, Helmut Title: Pharmaceutical Cargo Theft in Europe: A Realistic View of the Current Trends, Challenges, and Financial Impacts Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Cargo theft in Europe is a highly sophisticated crime of opportunity - and it's increasing in number of incidents both in transit and from facilities, and also in the cost of lost goods and associated expenses. Criminals are becoming more organized and frequently target high-value products such as Electronics, Tobacco, Food and Drinks, and Pharmaceuticals. Most of these crimes are thefts from trucks at unsecured parking sites, but violent crimes such as hijackings and robberies are occurring more often, as is the use of jamming technology and weapons. Products stolen in one country are often distributed via international criminal channels to neighboring countries and even to other continents. In addition, cargo thieves are employing new modi operandi (MO) that are more devious and violent. And there are several "hot spot" areas where risk of cargo theft is increasing and where heightened security measures are advisable. Common to all industries and countries throughout Europe is a gross underreporting of cargo theft incidents, which often gives manufacturers and shippers a false sense of security. The theft within the pharmaceutical supply chain is a good example of all these trends, as seen in this informative report. This document is intended to provide manufacturers and logistic providers with a realistic view of the risk of pharmaceutical theft in Europe and the associated cost implications. To this end, the report provides key insights into these pressing questions: - How much underreporting of pharmaceuticals cargo theft is there? - How much is cargo theft a business threat for pharmaceutical companies? - What modi operandi (MO) trends are evolving and which is the biggest risk? - What are the riskiest European locations for pharmaceutical theft? - What is the true cost of theft in this industry? Details: Austin, Texas: FreightWatch International, 2016. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2019 at: https://files.carrier.com/sensitech/en/contentimages/FWIEuropeanPharmaweb.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.sensitech.com/de/resources/white-papers/white-papers-article/fwi__pharmaceutical_cargo_theft_in_europe.aspx Shelf Number: 156982 Keywords: Cargo Theft Pharmaceutical Drugs Supply Chain Management Theft of Goods Transportation Security |
Author: United States Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General Title: FAA Needs to Adopt a Risk-Based, Data-Driven Scheduling Process to Improve the Effectiveness of its Drug Abatement Inspection Program Summary: What We Looked At: Effective drug and alcohol testing programs in the transportation industry are critical to ensuring the safety of the traveling public. The National Transportation Safety Board recently highlighted this issue in its 2017-2018 Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements, stating that various issues have led to an epidemic of impairment in transportation. Given this important safety concern, our office initiated a series of reviews on drug testing programs within the Department of Transportation, beginning with this audit of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Our objective was to assess the effectiveness of FAA's inspection program. Specifically, we evaluated FAA's risk-based approach for prioritizing and selecting companies for inspection and the basis for the risk factors used. What We Found: The system FAA uses to develop inspection schedules does not assign risk levels to companies or prioritize inspections based on risk -contrary to FAA's Safety Risk Management Policy, which was implemented to identify hazards, analyze and assess safety risk, and develop controls. Instead, FAA judgmentally selects where and when to conduct drug and alcohol inspections based on available inspection resources, company location, and FAA's desire to conduct as many inspections as possible. Also, the Drug Abatement Division experiences a high number of inspection cancellations. This is partly because its inspection scheduling decisions are based on inaccurate or incomplete company data and it does not coordinate with FAA Flight Standards inspectors to share information prior to scheduling inspections. When these cancellations occur, FAA has not established a risk-based process for selecting substitute companies for inspection. As a result, the Agency is missing opportunities to better target its drug and alcohol program inspections based upon available data and those companies that pose greater risks. Our Recommendations: We made two recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the Drug Abatement Program. FAA concurred with both of our recommendations. We consider both of our recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, 2019. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2019 at: https://www.oversight.gov/report/dot/faa-needs-adopt-risk-based-data-driven-scheduling-process-improve-effectiveness-its-drug Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Drug%20Abatement%20Final%20Report%5E06-25-19.pdf Shelf Number: 158100 Keywords: Drug Testing Risk Management Transportation Security |